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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 




W. BERNARD RICHLAND, 
Charging Party. 
LEWIS, GREENWALD & OBERMAN, P.C., for 
Respondent 
ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ, ESQ., (JUDITH LEVITT, 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
On October 10, 1975, the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York 
filed a charge alleging that the Council of Supervisors and Administrators of 
the City of New York, Local 1, SASOC, AFL-CIO (CSA) engaged in a five-day 
strike on September 9, 10, 11, 12 and 16, 1975 against the New York City Board 
1 
of Education (Employer). 
Hearing Officer Determination 
A hearing officer determined that CSA engaged in a strike of supervisors 
and administrators as charged. The strike was simultaneous with a strike by 
the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) against the Employer and was in support 
of the UFT strike. 
_1 The disposition of this matter was long delayed' because of parallel pro-
ceedings in a court action brought by the Employer against CSA for an 
injunction. The details of the delay are specified in the hearing.officer's 
report and recommendations, 12 PERB 1(8001 (1979). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0117 
Board - D-0117 -2 
With respect to those matters that bear upon the penalty which this 
Board might impose, the hearing officer determined that "[a]lthough the 
educational processes of the Board of Education were effectively stopped by the 
UFT strike, the CSA strike was not without some impact. It contributed to the 
effectiveness of the UFT strike." He also determined that the strike was not 
occasioned by such acts of extreme provocation of the Board of Education as 
would detract from the responsibility of CSA for the strike and that "[tlhe 
financial resources of the CSA would be seriously strained by an extended loss 
of dues deduction and agency shop privileges". Finally, the hearing officer 
found that CSA had engaged in a prior strike seven years earlier, but that in 
the earlier strike, "the Board of Education was found to have engaged in acts 
of extreme provocation which detracted from its responsibility for the strike, 
but 'not to the point of exculpation.' Since the strike charged in the instant 
case, CSA has negotiated two contracts with the Board of Education without a 
strike or a strike threat." 
CSA has filed exceptions to the report and recommendations of the 
hearing officer. These exceptions contend that the hearing officer erred in 
determining that CSA engaged in a strike and that he further erred in that he 
failed to conclude that the conduct of CSA was caused by acts of extreme provo-
cation by the Board of Education. 
Discussion 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law of the hearing officer. . 
In determining the appropriate penalty, two matters require elaboration. 
The hearing officer reported that the CSA strike was in support of a strike by 
UFT and that the UFT strike had, in any event, effectively stopped the educa-
tional processes of the Board of Education. It is appropriate that we consider 
this circumstance in fixing the duration of the penalty to be imposed upon CSA 
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because §210.3(f)(ii) of the Taylor Law requires us to consider the impact of 
a strike upon the public health, safety and welfare of the community. Here, 
the impact of the CSA strike was slight. It does not follow, however, that a 
secondary strike would always have less impact than a primary strike. A 
secondary strike could have more impact upon public health, safety and welfare 
than does the primary strike if, for example, teachers supported a strike by 
cafeteria employees. 
The second matter that requires elaboration is the effect of the prior 
strike of CSA, given the hearing officer's recommendation that we "should deem 
this strike as something less than a second violation of §210.1 by CSA because 
the earlier strike was provoked by the Board of Education, even if not to the 
point of exculpation." Ordinarily, for a second strike by employees not per-
forming public safety functions, we would impose an indefinite forfeiture of 
dues checkoff and agency shop privileges, with permission granted to the employee 
organization to apply for the restoration of those privileges after one year, 
provided that during the interim it had negotiated an agreement without striking 
or threatening to strike. Here, CSA has negotiated two agreements since 1975 
without a strike or a strike threat. Moreover, the employer's extreme provo-
cation of the earlier strike must be considered. But for the earlier strike, we 
would have imposed a three-month forfeiture of dues deduction and agency shop 
privileges. Because that earlier strike was extremely provoked but "not to the 
point of exculpation", we impose a forfeiture of four months. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the dues deduction and agency shop 
privileges of the CSA be suspended for a period 
of four months commencing on the first practi-
cable date, provided, however, that if such 
deductions are not made in twelve equal install-
r—n.r^jr\ ments per annum, the forfeiture shall continue 
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for the period of time during which one-third of 
CSA's annual dues and agency shop fee payments 
would be deducted* Thereafter, no dues or 
agency shop fees shall be deducted on behalf of 
CSA until it affirms that it no longer asserts 
the right to strike against any government, as 
required by §210.3(g) of the Taylor Law. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
April 9, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Board Member Ida Klaus did not participate in 
the consideration of this matter. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ONONDAGA, 
Respondent, 
-and-
ONONDAGA COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 834, 
Charging Party. 
RALPH I. GREENHOUSE, ESQ., (D. JEFFREY GOSCH, of 
Counsel), for the Respondent 
BOYLE & VITA, ESQS., (EARLE P. BOYLE, of Counsel), 
for the Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on exceptions taken by the County of Onondaga 
(County) to the decision of a hearing officer that it refused to negotiate in 
good faith with the Onondaga County Chapter of the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 834 (CSEA). The charge of CSEA, which the hearing 
officer sustained, had alleged that the County had violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law by unilaterally discontinuing a past practice of assigning vehicles 
to employees of the County's Department of Health, Division of Environmental 
Sanitation, on a 24-hour basis. The exceptions are as follows: 
1. The charge was untimely filed. 
2. The matter is covered by the collective bargaining agreement 
between the parties and is, therefore, not appropriate for 
consideration as an improper practice. 
3. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 
4. The proposed Order usurps the lawful authority of -the County 
of Onondaga. 
5. The proposed Order is too broad. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2737 
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FACTS 
The charge was filed by CSEA on June 13, 1977. The County denied the 
material allegations of the charge and raised the affirmative defense that the 
charge was not timely. 
The circumstances giving rise to the charge are substantially undis-
puted. On April 19, 1976, Dr. William A. Harris, the County Commissioner of 
Health, issued a memorandum that as of April 21, 1976, motor vehicles pre-
viously assigned to employees on a rpund-the-clock basis would be stored at a 
car pool and checked out to them as needed. Previously, while the cars had 
been furnished to employees for on-site inspections during and outside of their 
normal working hours, they had also been used for their personal transportation 
to and from work. Although the practice of assigning cars to employees on this 
basis was of long standing, dating back at least to 1967, it had not been in-
corporated in any of the parties' contracts. Further, the parties stipulated 
that "there is nothing in the job specifications for the titles involved in 
this proceeding stating that vehicles are an incident of employment". However, 
the availability to employees of County vehicles for their personal transporta-
tion to and from work had been communicated to job applicants by the Bureau 
Chief and had been an inducement to them to take the job. 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Timeliness 
The hearing officer found the charge to be timely even though CSEA did 
not file it with PERB until fourteen (14) months following the issuance of the 
April 1976 memorandum. We affirm his decision. The record supports his con-
clusion that the affected employees, CSEA, and some of the County agents 
charged with implementing the change reasonably believed it to be experimental 
and not permanent. Three employees - Soule, the President of the CSEA unit; 
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Orr, one of the Bureau Chiefs; and Harris, the Commissioner of Health who 
issued the April 19th memo - all testified that it was their belief that the 
1 
program was "experimental" and subject to review after a trial period. More 
importantly, sometime before April 1976, Soule was told by the Financial 
Officer of the Department of Health that "...management was trying to have the 
issue revoked and please don't take any union action until such time as it was 
definite". 
Guala, the Director of the Division of Environmental Sanitation, met 
with his Bureau Chiefs on the 26th of January and indicated that he would 
implement a voluntary mileage reimbursement program for those employees who 
chose to use their own cars in lieu of the County car. The following day he 
met with two unit employees and advised them that the use of County vehicles 
on a 24-hour basis would not be. reinstated. These employees were not CSEA 
representatives. On February 14, 1977, he met with most of the Division 
employees, including Embury, the CSEA Division representative. It was at that 
meeting that the finality of the decision was first disclosed to CSEA. CSEA 
relies upon this date as marking the commencement of the period for determining 
the timeliness of the charge. 
We find, on these facts, that the County is estopped from arguing that 
2 
the charge should have been filed within four months-of April 19, 1976. It was 
at the County's behest, and thus in the interest of maintaining harmonious 
relations, that the CSEA refrained from filing a charge until the experiment 
1^  Harris could not recall having used the word "experimental". Nevertheless, 
he testified that he did consider it to be such and so advised the involved 
employees. 
2_ The four month provision is not a jurisdictional requirement that is imposed 
by statute; it is an affirmative defense that is made available by our 
Rules. 
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was completed and final action was taken. It was not until February 14, 1977, 
that CSEA was made aware that the decision was final. As the charge was 
filed within four months of that date, we deem the charge to be timely. 
Waiver of Right to Negotiate 
The County argues that it was under no duty to negotiate as to the 
discontinuation of the assignment of County vehicles because the matter was 
already covered by contract. It further argues that this Board cannot inter-
pret the contract. The contract clause relied upon by the County provides 
that it has the right, 
"...(4) to maintain the efficiency of government 
- operations entrusted to them, (5) to determine 
the method, means and personnel by which operations 
are to be conducted, (6) to take whatever actions 
may be necessary to carry out the mission, policies 
or purpose of the department, office or agency 
concerned...." 
The County's contention is not that this clause expressly deals with the 
use of vehicles, but that it does so generally and that it therefore 
constitutes a waiver of CSEA's right to negotiate about the matter. 
This Board may interpret an agreement in order to ascertain whether a 
union has waived its right to negotiate, St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 1f3058 
(1977) . The hearing officer found that there was no waiver by the CSEA of 
its right to negotiate as to the use of the County cars. He was not persuaded 
that the management's rights clause in the contract left this matter to the 
discretion of the County. We affirm the hearing officer's decision that the 
language involved does not constitute a waiver on the part of CSEA and that 
the respondent was therefore obligated to negotiate about the change for the 
reasons hereinafter stated. 
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DUTY TO,NEGOTIATE 
In County, of Cattaraugus, 8 PERB 1[4516 (1975) affirmed 8 PERB 113062 
(1975), it was held that employee use of an employer-owned car for personal 
purposes is an economic benefit and is a term and condition of employment which 
cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer. In that case the use of the 
car was an inducement relied upon by the employees in accepting employment and 
had "...a significant and material relationship to conditions of employment". 
That decision is applicable in this case. Here, too, the employees were 
offered and enjoyed an economic benefit as a significant and material condition 
of their employment. 
USURPATION OF'THE COUNTY'S AUTHORITY 
The County points to a resolution adopted by its legislature on July 5, 
1977, prohibiting the personal use of County vehicles by employees. It claims 
that this Board's remedial, powers do not permit it to set aside the legislative 
action of a County. This claim is without merit. When a County acts through 
its legislature to perpetuate an improper practice, that action is subject to 
the jurisdiction of this Board, Koenig v. Morin, 70 Misc.2d 185 (Monroe Co., 
1977), 10 PERB 1(7529. . 
NOW,:,THEREFORE, WE affirm the decision of the hearing officer, and 
WE ORDER the County of Onondaga to: 
1. Reinstate the practice of providing County-owned 
vehicles on a 24-hour basis to employees in the Division 
of Environmental Sanitation of the Department of Health. 
2. Reimburse the affected employees for reasonable expenses 
incurred by them in connection with their transportation 
to and from work, at a:, three-percent-^ per.. annum interest 
rate, retroactive to February 14, 1977. 
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3. Negotiate with CSEA, at its request, as to the 
use of County vehicles by employees in the Division of 
Environmental Sanitation of the Department of Health. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
April 10, 1979 
s 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Jk^.A^u^afe^. 
Ida Klaus, Member 
Id C. Randles> Me Davi  i } Mernb 
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In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
ASSOCIATION OF DISTRICT AND BOROUGH 
SUPERVISORS OF SCHOOL CUSTODIANS 
AND CUSTODIAN ENGINEERS, 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 891, 
STATE OF NEW YORK 




BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 




RAMON IRIZARRI, ESQ., for Respondent 
MORRIS WEISSBERG, ESQ., (FRANK J. PRIAL II, 
of Counsel)•for Charging Party 
WILLIAM F. CASSIN, SR., ESQ., for Intervenor 
The charge herein was brought by the Association of District and 
Borough Supervisors of School Custodians and Custodian Engineers (Association) 
Dn January 12, 1978. It alleges that the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (Employer) violated its duty to negotiate in 
jood faith by unilaterally abolishing its past practice of processing applica-
tions by supervisors who seek to revert to custodial positions and by refusing 
the Association's demand to negotiate about the matter. The supervisors were in 
a. negotiating unit represented by the Association at that time. The custodial 
jositions are in a unit represented by the International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local 891 (Intervenor). 
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In a decision issued on October 12, 1978, the hearing officer dismissed 
the petition on the ground that the matter in dispute was not a mandatory sub-
1 
ject of negotiation with the representative of the supervisors. 
FACTS 
Supervisors are paid a salary. The custodians in the District are paid 
an allowance based primarily on the size of the school to which they are 
assigned. The custodian must provide for the upkeep and maintenance of the 
juilding from this allowance, from which he also derives compensation for his 
services. Thus, assignment to several schools, or to a larger school, usually 
neans a larger allowance and offers the opportunity for greater compensation. 
Custodians at larger schools may, therefore, earn more than supervisors. Since 
1952, the Employer has utilized a Custodial Rating and Transfer Plan, which pro-
vides, so far as is here relevant, that, for purposes of transfer, custodians 
tfill be ranked according to seniority and job performance. Although, by its 
terms, the Rating and Transfer Plan does not apply to supervisors, for many 
/•ears the Employer allowed supervisors to make application for reversion to 
the position of custodian and assignment to schools in which there were custo-
L_ On November 1, 1978, the charging party filed exceptions to the hearing 
officer's decision. At that time, a representation petition by the 
Intervenor for certification in the unit represented by the charging party 
was being processed (C-1764). Following an election in which a majority 
of the employees in the supervisors' unit selected the Intervenor as their 
representative, this Board, on January 24, 1979, certified the Intervenor 
as the negotiating representative of the supervisors. The Employer now 
moves to dismiss the exceptions on the ground that the dispute has become 
"academic," the charging party no longer having standing to complain that 
the Employer is refusing to negotiate with it because the Employer is no 
longer under any duty to do so.. The Intervenor, which is now the represen-
tative of the supervisors as well as of the custodians, supports this 
motion. In view of our position on the merits of the charge, we do not 
find it necessary to pass upon the motion. 
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dial vacancies. The supervisors' participation in the transfer provisions of 
the Plan was never a term of their contract and was not negotiated with them. 
During the negotiations with the Intervenor for a successor to the 
custodians' 1972-75 contract, supervisors were eliminated from participation 
in the transfer provisions of the Rating and Transfer Plan. Subsequently, the 
Employer refused to accept applications for reversion and transfer by three 
supervisors. When, on January 5, 1978, the matter was sought to be negotiated 
by the Association during its contract negotiations, the Employer refused the 
request. At that point, the Association filed the improper practice charge. 
DISCUSSION 
The hearing officer correctly held that the practice of allowing super-
visors to apply for reversion and transfer to custodial vacancies is not a 
term and condition of their employment. The movement of employees from a posi-
tion within their negotiating unit to a position in another unit is not a term 
or condition of their employment within the meaning of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act, City of Albany, 7 PERB 1f3078 (1974), Somers Faculty 
Association, 9 PERB 1(3014 (1976) and Onondaga Community College, 11 PERB 1(3045 
(1978). 
The charging! party, in its exceptions, asserts that a public employer 
that has, for many years, conferred upon its employees a benefit which was not 
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining may not unilaterally discontinue 
such benefit and then refuse to bargain about it with the employees' representa-
tive. The cases cited by the charging party do not support this assertion. 
On i.ithe contrary, we have held that a non-mandatory subject does not become 
mandatory because it is voluntarily negotiated, Troy Firefighters, 10 PERB 
1(3105 (1977). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
April 10, 1979 
•&AL 'aZ^B'/C A/J>~Lr*<-&*-^' 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
G*^ *-* AZ&US***I 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
: ' . //2D-4/9/79 
In the Matter of : 
PARISHVILLE-HOPKINTON CENTRAL SCHOOL : BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
DISTRICT, : 
Respondent, : CASE NO. U-3059 
-and- : 
PARISHVILLE-HOPKINTON CENTRAL SCHOOL : 
NON-TEACHER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, : 
Charging Party. : 
PETER D. LIVELY, for Respondent 
DONALD MESIBOV, for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Parishville-Hopkinton Central School 
Non-Teacher Employees Association (Association) on December 23, 1977. It 
alleges that the Parishville-Hopkinton Central School District (District) 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees'Fair Employment Act in that it 
unilaterally extended the workday of secretaries who are within the negotiating 
unit and that it refused the Association's demands to negotiate over the 
extension. 
On or about August 17, 1977, while negotiations for a successor agree-
ment were awaiting mediation, the District's Supervising Principal informed two 
of the District's secretaries that the secretaries were to remain in the school 
offices until 4:00 P.M. beginning September 1, 1977. Although the expired 
contract between the District and the Association contained no provision con-
cerning the hours of the workday, the offices had closed at 3:30 P.M. for the 
past ten years. 
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The extended workday schedule was implemented on September 1, 1977. 
There is no evidence or indication that the Association was or should have 
been aware of the extension before September 1977. On or about September 15, 
1977, the Association informed the District that it considered the action a 
unilateral change and it insisted that the status quo be restored and that 
there be no extension of the workday unless one be negotiated. On October 15, 
1977, a District spokesman replied that he understood the matter had been re-
solved between the District and the Association. Within the next two weeks 
the Association discovered that the matter had not been resolved and it so 
informed the District on November 1, 1977. On or about December 16, it re-
quested that the extended workday be rescinded and stated that the District 
should request negotiations if it wanted to extend the workday. The District 
responded that to open the issue at that time would jeopardize ratification of 
a successor agreement. The Association then filed this charge. 
In December 1977, a successor agreement, retroactive to July 1, 1977, 
was ratified. This agreement, which contained a salary increase for secretaries 
and other employees, does not refer to the extension of the workday. 
After the Association's filing of this improper practice charge, the 
District executed a stipulation in which it conceded that it had unilaterally 
extended the workday of secretaries and that it had refused the Association's 
request to submit the matter to negotiation, "thus effectively refusing to 
bargain on the matter". In defense of its actions, the District argued before 
the hearing officer that (1) the charge was not timely and, (2) the collective 
agreement entered into by the Association and the District in December, 1977, 
constituted a "waiver" by the Association of its right to negotiate over the 
extra time for secretaries. The waiver argument is not based upon any express 
language to that effect in the agreement, but upon the argument that the wage 
increase was designed by the parties to compensate the secretaries for the 
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extension of the workday from 3:30 P.M. to 4:00 P.M. The District further 
argued that the extension of the workday did not add to the working time of 
the secretaries because compensatory time off was provided through an expansion 
of their lunch period. 
The hearing officer found that the District had unilaterally extended 
the workday of secretaries and that it had refused to negotiate over the change 
He also found that the District's two defenses were without merit. As to the 
defense of timeliness, he determined that the Association was not aware of the 
extension of the workday before September 1977, a period within four months of 
the charge. The District has not taken exception to this determination. As to 
the defense of waiver, he determined that the District never communicated to 
the Association that it deemed the 1977-79 contract increase in the secretaries' 
salaries to be compensation for the change in their workday. Accordingly, he 
concluded that the Union's agreement to the salary provision did not constitute 
a waiver of negotiations as to the change in the workday. 
The hearing officer determined that the half-hour added to the workday 
constituted an increase in the work time of the secretaries and ordered that 
the secretaries be compensated for that time. 
In its exceptions, the District disputes the hearing officer's deter-
mination that the Association .made a demand that it negotiate as to the 
extension of the workday or that it refused to do so. It bases this exception 
upon the absence of a formal demand and argues that this absence caused "a 
confused state of affairs". It also contends that the extension of the workday 
did not add to the working time of the secretaries because the secretaries were 
given an extended lunch break, and, therefore, the hearing officer should not 
have proposed the .remedy that the secretaries be compensated for the^extension 
1 
of the workday. 
1 The hearing officer found that the secretaries were not given an extended 
lunch break. Q^QQ 
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DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. 
The exceptions of the District are based upon narrow and meaningless 
distinctions. First, the District contends that the hearing officer should 
not have relied upon its concession that by its conduct it was "effectively 
refusing to bargain on the matter", because the concession constituted a 
statement of opinion and not of fact. Second, while admitting that it knew 
that the Association was seeking to negotiate over the extension of the work1^ 
day, it argues that it was confused by the absence of a formal demand. These 
arguments are not persuasive. The District's characterization of its own 
conduct in the stipulation is supported by the facts set forth in it and is 
sufficient to establish a violation of its duty to negotiate in good faith. 
The record also establishes that the unilateral extension of the workday added 
working time to the secretaries' schedules. Accordingly, we adopt the order 
recommended by the hearing officer. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the Parishville-Hopkinton Central School 
District restore the work schedule of secretaries 
that existed prior to September 1, 1977 and that 
it compensate the affected secretaries for the 
hours in excess thereof worked by them thereafter 
on a pro rata percentage of their 1977-79 contract 
salary plus interest at three percent per annum. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
April 10, 1979 
-jfSZkjZ £ m^try* 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
3U£_ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
/C^e^^a^ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NOS. U-2896/U-2971 
-and-
NASSAU CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ., (ALVIN M. SCHWARTZ, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
JACK OLCHIN, ESQ., for Respondent 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Nassau Chapter of the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA), to a hearing officer's 
decision dismissing its consolidated charges. The.first charge (U-2896) 
complained that the Nassau County Medical Center (County) had unilaterally 
instituted a new morning shift for certain unit employees. The second charge 
(U-2971) complained that the County unilaterally instituted a Saturday shift 
for certain unit employees. In both charges, CSEA alleged as well that the 
County refused to negotiate over the impact of these unilateral changes. 
In dismissing the charges, the hearing officer determined that the 
County had unilaterally instituted new shifts as charged, but that in their 
5705 
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1 
agreement CSEA had conceded to the County the right to do so. He also 
determined that the County had not violated any duty to negotiate over the 
impact of its unilaterally instituted shift changes because CSEA had never 
demanded such negotiations. 
CSEA's exceptions contested both determinations of the hearing officer. 
It argues that the hearing officer .misread the contract in determining that 
it had conceded to the County the right to change the work schedules. It 
further argues that the hearing officer .misread the evidence in the record in 
determining that it had not made a demand of the County to negotiate over the 
impact of the changed work schedules. 
We affirm the determinations of the hearing officer. In our opinion, 
the broad management rights clause negotiated by;the parties constitutes a 
waiver of CSEA's right to negotiate as to the work schedules involved in this 
case. We also find no evidence in the record that CSEA demanded negotiations 
over the impact of the changed work schedules. 
1^  The hearing officer relied upon §3.2 of the agreement between the County of 
Nassau and the Nassau Chapter of CSEA, which provides: 
"3.2 Except as validly limited by this agreement, the County 
reserves the right to determine the standards of service to be offered 
by its various agencies; to set the standards of selection for 
employment; to direct its employees; to regulate work schedules; 
to take disciplinary action; to relieve its employees from duty 
because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; to maintain 
the efficiency of governmental operations; to determine the methods, 
means and personnel by which governmental operations are to be 
conducted; to determine the content of job classifications; to take 
all necessary actions to carry out its mission in emergencies; and 
to exercise complete control and discretion over its organization 
and the technology of performing its work. (Emphasis Supplied)." 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that both charges be, and they hereby are, 
dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
April -.9, 1979 
-jfa>i*£<& J^A/ZZ* 
'jr^+c 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
/d^guc^ 
David C. Randies , Melhber 
'J* 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FREEPORT UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
FREEPORT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 
2660, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES, INC., by 
JOSEPH A. IGOE, for Respondent 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, 
by HOWARD EDELMAN, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Freeport Union Free 
School District (the Employer) to a hearing officer's determination that it 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Civil Service Law (the Act) in that it 
improperly reassigned Mary Rice from the kindergarten to the third grade at the 
Columbus Avenue School because of her participation in the activities of the 
Freeport Teachers Association, Local 2660, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (the charging 
party). As building coordinator for the charging party at the Columbus Avenue 
School, Rice brought many faculty complaints to the Employer, with particular 
attention given to the complaints of kindergarten teachers. 
The remedy proposed in the report of the hearing officer provides that 
Rice should be offered the position of kindergarten teacher at the Columbus 
Avenue School at the commencement of the second semester of the 1978-79 school 
year. 
In its exceptions, the Employer contends that the charge should have 
been dismissed because the hearing officer did not find that the Employer's 
conduct was motivated by animus toward the charging party. It further contends 
#2F-4/9/79 
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that the evidence does not support the hearing officer's determination that the 
Principal of the Columbus Avenue School knew that Rice was the building 
coordinator for the charging party. Finally, it contends that the proposed 
remedy is inappropriate because the assignment of a teacher to a particular 
grade involves educational judgments that are beyond the authority of PERB 
to make; moreover, a mid-year switch in assignments would be detrimental to 
both the kindergarten and the third grade. 
The charging party responds that the hearing officer's decision is 
correct and that his recommended order should be imposed because to permit the 
wrong to continue is to condone it. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record, we find that the evidence supports the 
determination of the hearing officer that the building principal was aware of 
Rice's position as building coordinator for the charging party. We also affirm 
the hearing officer's conclusion that animus against an employee organization 
is not an essential element of a violation of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act, 
State of New York, 10 PERB 1(3108 (1977). The relevant language of the statute 
is that a public employer commits an improper practice (a) when it interferes 
with employees in the exercise of their protected rights "for the purpose of 
depriving them of such rights" and (c) when it discriminates against employees 
"for the purpose of...discouraging...participation in the activities of, any 
employee organization". Rice's activities on behalf of the charging party were 
protected by the Act and were known to the Employer. We conclude from the 
evidence that the Principal of the Columbus Avenue School was disturbed by 
those activities and he transferred her from the kindergarten to the third 
grade in order to interfere with them by disrupting communications between 
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Rice and the other kindergarten teachers. Whether or not the building 
principal may, in fact, have felt animus toward the charging party is 
irrelevant. His reason for interfering with those activities, thereby 
discriminating against Rice, was sufficient to establish a violation within 
the meaning of the Act. The record establishes that the transfer of Rice, a 
kindergarten teacher of 12 years, to the third grade was made for the purpose 
of interfering with her rights under §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act, and not 
for educational policy reasons. Accordingly, contrary to the Employer's 
claim, this Board has not substituted its judgment for an educational policy 
decision of the Employer. In any event, actions that might generally be within 
the discretion of a public employer are nevertheless subject to the remedial 
powers of this Board when they are taken for reasons prohibited by §209-a.l 
of the Act, Bd. of Ed., CSD No. 1, Grand Island v. Helsby, 32 NY 2d 660 (1973), 
6 PERB 1f7004; City of Albany v. PERB, 43NY 2d 954 (1978), 11 PERB 1f7007. 
We determine that the remedy proposed by the hearing officer is appro-
priate. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Freeport Union Free School District to: 
1. Cease and desist from engaging in discriminatory 
and coercive conduct toward employees in the exercise 
of their rights protected by the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act; 
2. Restore Mary Rice to the position of kindergarten 
teacher at the Columbus Avenue School; and 
3. Conspicuously post a notice in the form attached at 
locations ordinarily used for written communications 
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to employees of the Coliunbus Avenue School. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
April 10, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
<?J-4U jCx-itM&r 
Ida Klaus , Member 
&J£7£L 
David C. Randies , Member 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEE! 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: 
1. The Freeport Union Free School District will not engage 
in.discriminatory or coercive conduct towards employees 
as a result of the exercise of rights protected under the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; and 
2. The Freeport UFSD will restore Mary Rice to the position 




This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, snd must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : 
: #2G-4/9/79 
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, : 
Employer, : 
-and- : 
OPERATORS AND ASSISTANT OPERATORS : 
REPRESENTATION GROUP, : BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Petitioner, : 
: CASE NO. C-1684 
-and- : 




LOCAL 14551, UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF : 
AMERICA, : 
Intervener. : 
•STACK & TAVANO, ESQS., (BERNARD E. STACK, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for Petitioner 
CARL MOORADIAN, ESQ., for Employer 
McMAHON & GROTTY, ESQS., (E. JOSEPH GIROUX, JR., 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Local 15071 
WILLIAM GRACE, ESQ., for Local 14551 
On May 24, 1978, the Operators and Assistant Operators Representation 
Group (petitioner) filed a petition for certification as the representative of 
a unit of employees of the Utilities Department of the City of Niagara Falls 
comprising Operators and Assistant Operators in the Sewer Division and Operators 
Assistant Operators and Control Maintenance Mechanics in the Water Division. 
There are approximately 41 Sewer Operators and Assistant Sewer Operators in a 
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negotiating unit of about 450 employees that is currently represented by 
Local 15071 of the United Steel Workers. Most of the employees in that unit 
perform white-collar work. There are approximately 32 Water Operators, 
Assistant Water Operators and Control Maintenance Mechanics in a separate 
negotiating unit that is represented by Local 14551 of the United Steel Workers. 
Both Local 15071 and Local 14551 intervened in the proceeding. 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation determined 
that the Sewer Operators and Assistants had a close community of interest with 
the Water Operators, Assistants and Control Maintenance Mechanics and that this 
community of interest was greater than that between the Sewer Operators and 
Assistants and the other employees in the larger unit represented by Local 
15071. He also found that the proposed unit was consistent with the other 
standards specified in §207.1 of the Public Employees Fair Employment Act. 
Accordingly, he-proposed the establishment of a negotiating unit that would 
contain the two groups of employees. He further determined that two Instrument 
Technicians and nine Control Maintenance Mechanics in the Sewage Plant not 
sought by petitioner should be added to that unit. 
Local 15071 has filed exceptions to the determination of the Director. 
In its exceptions, Local 15071 argue^ lthat-"the::Blrector-):'feEred":in:adeterjninirig,':.: 
that^the Sewer Division employees share a close community of interest with the 
Water Division employees and that they do not have as close a community of 
interest with the other employees in the existing unit represented by Local 
15071. No exceptions were filed by the Employer, the petitioner, or Local 
14551. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record, we find that the evidence supports the con-
clusions reached by the Director. Most significantly, the Operators and 
Assistant Operators of both the Water and Sewer Divisions work according to a 
21-shift weekly schedule that is designed to accommodate the employer's 
Board - C-1684 -3 
need to keep both operations open 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The 
Operators and Assistants in both Divisions work a schedule of seven days on 
and two days off, with no holidays. In both Divisions the employee enters as 
an Assistant and has the opportunity to advance to the position of Operator. 
In both Divisions the Operators and Assistants purify water through the use of 
filters and chemicals and both groups use similar pumps to keep the water 
moving. The same type and level of skills is required of the employees in both 
Divisions. By way of contrast, most other employees in the unit represented by 
Local 15071 work a regular 9:00 - 5:00 schedule, with holidays and weekends off. 
Thirty to thirty-five auto mechanics in that unit do work in shifts, but they, 
too, have weekends and holidays off. On this evidence, we affirm the deter-
mination of the Director that the Operators and Assistant Operators in the 
Sewer Division should be in a single unit with the Operators, Assistant Oper-
ators and Control Maintenance Mechanics of the Water Division. 
We also affirm his determination that the Mechanics and Technicians in 
the Sewage Plant should be included in that unit. The Sewer Mechanics are 
the counterparts of the Control Maintenance Mechanics in the Water Division. 
There are no counterparts of the Sewer Technicians currently in the Water 
Division only because the appropriate instruments involved in those duties are 
not now operational there. Although the employees who fill these added posi-
tions do work regular hours in rotating shifts, they nevertheless have more in 
common with the Operators and Assistants in the Water and Sewer Divisions than 
they do with the remaining employees in the unit represented by Local 15071. 
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INCLUDED: Pumping plant operator, assistant pumping plant 
operator, filter operator, assistant filter 
operator, water and sewer control maintenance 
mechanic, sewage plant operator, sewage plant 
assistant operator, instrument technician. 
EXCLUDED: All other employees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there be an election by secret ballot under 
the supervision of the Director among the employees in the unit determined to 
be appropriate who were employed by the City of Niagara Falls on the payroll 
1 
date immediately preceding the date of this decision. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the City of Niagara Falls submit to the 
Director, the petitioner and the employee organizations participating in the 
election, within 15 days from the date of this decision, an alphabetized list 
of all employees within the unit described above who were employed on the pay-
roll date immediately preceding this decision. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
April 10, 1979 
jh^t^uZ^^ fsh&-l4^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
%L+~ Jt£esUA**^> 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Memb 
1 Both Local 15071 and Local 14551 are eligible to participate in the election 
along with the petitioner. If they desire to do so, they should advise the 
Director and all parties within ten working days from receipt of this 
decision. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the
 : 
//2H-4/9/79 
LYNBROOK DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS UNIT OF THE; 
NASSAU COUNTY CHAPTER, LOCAL 830, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., NASSAU COUNTY ..i
 : BOARD DECISION 
CHAPTER, LOCAL 830, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES AND ORDER 
ASSOCIATION, INC. , and the CIVIL SERVICE
 : 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,, CASE NO. D-0174 
Respondents, 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 210.1 
of the Civil Service Law. ; 
On January 16, 1979, Martin L. Barr, Counsel to this Board, 
filed a charge alleging that the respondents herein had violated 
Civil Service Law (CS.E)i §210.1 in that they caused, instigated, 
encouraged, condoned and engaged in a strike against the Village 
of Lynbrook on September 21, 22, 23, 25 and 26, 1978. 
Respondents agreed to forego filing an answer and 
thus admit to all allegations of the charge, upon the understand 
ing that the charging party would recommend and this Board would 
accept a penalty of forfeiture of their deduction privileges for 
six months. The charging party has recommended a six-month 
suspension of the respondents' deduction privileges. 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the 
respondents violated CSL §210.1 in that they engaged in a strike 
as charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is a 
reasonable one. 
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WE ORDER that all dues deduction privileges arranged by 
the Nassau County Chapter, Local 830, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. (Chapter), as exclusive representative of 
Department of Ptlblic Works employees of the Village of Lynbrook, 
and agency shop fee deductions, if any, be suspended for a 
period of 6 months commencing on the first practicable date. 
Thereafter, no dues and agency shop fees shall be deducted by 
the Village of Lynbrook from the salaries of said employees on 
behalf of the Chapter, the Lynbrook Department of Public Works 
Unit of the Nassau County Chapter, Local 830, CSEA, Inc. (Unit), 
or CSEA, Inc., until the Unit and the Chapter affirm that they 
no longer assert the right to strike against any government,: as 
required by the provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: Albany, New York 
April 10, 1979 
^^I^L^L^c 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIO BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LEVITTOWN PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
- and -
#21-4/9/79 
E m p l o y e r , 
C a s e No. C-172S 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
NASSAU CHAPTER, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Nassau Chapter, AFSCME, AFL-CIO ' '" . 
-has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full and part-time professionals, 
non-professionals, custodial and 
maintenance employees. 
Excluded: All pages, Director, Assistant to Director, j 
Secretary to Director, Public Information \ 
Assistant, Senior Account Clerk, Senior i 
Library Clerk in Administrative Office, and ! 
Clerk-Typist in Administrative Office. j 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public I 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service j 
Employees Association, Nassau Chapter, AFSCME, AFL-CIO j 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances-
v Signed on the 9th day of 





Harold R. Newman, Chairman' 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Memker 
